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METAPHYSICAL PERPLEXITY?
Steven D. Smith'
My goal in this opening session is to give a distillation of the book, Law's
Quandary, in a way that will serve to explain the title to this conference.
The program says that "the perplexity is metaphysical." But what is the
"perplexity" that afflicts modern law? And in what way is that perplexity
"metaphysical"? What would it even mean for a perplexity to be
"metaphysical"?
In trying to answer these questions, this is what I'm going to do: I will first
offer a very rough preliminary statement of what the perplexity is, as I see
it. Then I want to describe the thesis that, if correct, would explain how our
perplexity is "metaphysical" in nature. The thesis, in a sentence, is that law-
talk today (like so much of our talk) operates in an "ontological gap"; but
that claim is hardly self-explanatory, so I will try to explain what I mean by
that phrase. Next I want to summarize, very briefly, the main arguments for
the thesis, after which I will try to restate more accurately what the
"perplexity" or "quandary" is. Finally, I will briefly discuss several possible
interpretations of our predicament-of our perplexity, or quandary.
Is LAW-TALK "JUST WORDS"?
So, what is the "perplexity" that afflicts law today? First let me say what
the criticism is not. I'm not arguing that law is pervasively unjust. (Maybe it
is, maybe it isn't; but in any case that is not my argument.) Neither am I
making the criticism that law, or legal reasoning, is indeterminate. That
criticism is very familiar, but in my view the perceived indeterminacy of law
is merely a symptom of a deeper difficulty.
Here is a first attempt at describing that deeper difficulty: the perplexity
or quandary in which law currently finds itself lies in the fact that law-talk
today is-or at least is widely perceived as being-"just words." This was a
recurring complaint throughout the twentieth century. In this vein, Karl
Llewellyn attacked lawyers' tendency to use "words that masquerade as
things." A good deal of legal discourse "is in terms of words," he thought:
'Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego. I thank Larry Alexander
and Merina Smith for pre-conference comments on a version of this talk. For obvious reasons
it would not be advisable to change this paper from the way in which it was presented. I very
much appreciate the comments of other participants in the conference, however, and I thank
Dean Wagner, Professor Lewis, and the Catholic University of America for organizing this
conference.
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"it centers on words; it has the utmost difficulty in getting beyond words."'
A couple of decades earlier, Roscoe Pound had said much the same thing:
lawyerly argumentation, Pound thought, was pretty much just "empty
words. '2
Fast forwarding, we find Alexander Aleinikoff criticizing an opinion of
Justice Potter Stewart: "Although Stewart's opinion uses all the right
words," Aleinikoff says, "in the end they are simply that: just words."3
Much the same might be said-is said, often-of many judicial opinions.
Thus, Dan Farber observes that Supreme Court opinions seem
"increasingly arid, formalistic, and lacking in intellectual value .... [They]
almost seem designed to wear the reader into submission as much as
actually to persuade.,
4
And of course legal scholars are not guilt-free. On the contrary. In a
recent survey of contemporary legal scholarship published in the Harvard
Law Review, Deborah Rhode suggests that a good deal of legal scholarship
deserves the description once given of Warren Harding's speeches: it is "'an
army of pompous phrases moving over the landscape in search of an idea." 5
Except in an allusive way in the book's preface, I do not discuss the
condition of contemporary writing on legal theory or jurisprudence
specifically. But I think the same judgment-that "It's just a lot of
words"-is widely shared. Indeed, many might view legal theory as an a
fortiori case. So the story might recount how, starting maybe a half-century
ago, an elite corps of legal theorists decided that their task was to elucidate
something that they sometimes describe as the "concept" of law. But what
sort of thing is the "concept" of law? What exactly are the theorists
supposed to be elucidating? Not just ordinary usage of the word "law,"
surely: that seems a job for linguists. Not the real-world functioning of the
institutions we associate with "law": that seems an empirical task for social
scientists.
Nonetheless, theorists continue to provide increasingly refined accounts
of the "concept" of law, though it is unclear just what it is that they think
they are clarifying. In this situation, it is not surprising that skeptics may
conclude that highly technical jurisprudential discussions-battles between
1. Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431,
443,449 (1930) (emphasis added).
2. Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605,621 (1908).
3. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J.
943, 983 (1987) (emphasis added).
4. Daniel A. Farber, Missing the "Play of Intelligence," 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 147,
147, 157 (1994).
5. Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Scholarship, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1327,1327 (2002) (quoting
WILLIAM G. McADOO, CROWDED YEARS 389 (1931)).
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"exclusive" and "inclusive" legal positivists, for example-are mostly verbal
in nature.
So the suspicion that law-talk, whether emanating from scholars or courts,
is "just words" is a recurring one. Indeed, even if they do not express the
suspicion in quite this way, the numerous scholars over the last century who
have tried to move away from conventional legal discourse in favor of some
"law-and" discipline-law and economics, law and philosophy, law and
whatever-are acting on the sense that law-talk in itself is somehow
empty-"just words."
And yet.., this is an enigmatic complaint. After all, what else would a
form of discourse be if not "words"? So what are the critics complaining
about? Might the criticism itself-the criticism that law-talk is "just
words"-itself be "just words"? And how might this embarrassment be
"metaphysical" in nature?
ONTOLOGICAL GAPS
Two or three generations ago a prominent movement in philosophy might
have provided confident answers to these questions. I refer to the so-called
logical positivists, who argued that all meaningful statements are either
analytical in nature (like "all bachelors are unmarried") or else empirical
(like "the duck is on the pond"): the rest of our talk amounts to a sort of
"metaphysical nonsense." So unless translated into something more
analytical or empirical, a statement like "It is morally wrong to cheat on
your exams" is no more meaningful than "Twas brillig, and the slithy toves
Did gyre and gimble in the wabe.",6 In this way, the logical postivists
dismissed as "nonsense" a whole host of talk and learning, including much
of what is said about theology and morality.
And about law. On its face, after all, the proposition that, say, "a person
owes a duty of care to other persons who are foreseeably endangered by his
conduct" does not seem to be either analytical or empirical. I recall how,
when I was in practice, an associate who was working with me on a uranium
mine case asked me whether I thought our clients might have an
"incorporeal hereditament" in the uranium, or the mine. I'd never heard of
such a thing, but I suddenly had an image of the two of us feeling our way
through a dark mine, with flashlights and Geiger counters, searching high
and low for an "incorporeal hereditament." ("Is that one over there?"
"No, it's just the broken-off head of an old pickaxe.") Obviously, duties
and hereditaments aren't that sort of thing; they are not the kind of thing
that can be empirically verified. So a generation of legal thinkers who were
6. LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS AND WHAT ALICE FOUND
THERE 13 (Macmillan Publishing Co. 1963) (1872).
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influenced by logical positivism-the so-called legal realists-concluded
that all of these legal terms were meaningless. In this vein, Felix Cohen
famously argued that a whole host of legal concepts were "transcendental
nonsense."
7
Or, we might say, "just words."
By now the shortcomings of logical positivism are widely appreciated, and
so we might well conclude (with relief.., or maybe with disappointment)
that it is not possible to talk "nonsense" in this core sense after all. And yet
we still may not be able to shake the impression that at least in some
settings, people do talk nonsense-nonsense not in the sense of rubbish, or
lies, but non-sense. In any case, I am quite sure that I do (though I'll try
hard to keep this to a minimum today). We might speak words that have no
real meaning to us in an awkward social setting, or a catechism lesson -or a
constitutional law class. You've learned the words, and you know what
you're supposed to say, but you might admit, candidly, off-the-record: "I
don't really know what any of this means," or "I don't really understand
what we're talking about."
A Dilbert cartoon captures the experience. A goateed character (whose
name I don't know) exclaims, "Dilbert, my man, you're stayin' real and
keepin' to the core." Dilbert asks "Is that good?" and the fellow with the
goatee answers, "I don't even know what it means." In the final square,
Dilbert wonders, "Why do you say things that have no meaning?"-to
which the response is "DU-U-U-DE!"
So, what is happening in these instances in which we have the sense of
speaking, or hearing, "nonsense"? Law's Quandary offers an account of
this experience that draws on two notions-those of an "ontological
inventory" and an "ontological gap."
Our ontological inventory, simply put, is our list of the basic elements of
"what there is"-of, as D.C. Williams puts it, "the primary constituents of
this or any possible world, the very alphabet of being.",8 Ontological
inventories surely differ from culture to culture and even from person to
person. Chapter two discusses three major ontological families that I
suspect provide the raw materials for most of our inventories: I call these
the ontologies of everyday experience, of science, and of religion. One
whose ontological inventory is supplied largely by naturalistic science may
not list elements-such as spirit, or God, or perhaps mind-that an
inventory shaped by religion may contain.
7. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the FunctionalApproach, 35 COLUM. L.
REV. 809, 821 (1935).
8. D. C. Williams, The Elements of Being, 7 REV. METAPHYSICS (1953), reprinted in




My suggestion is that insofar as we can give an account of the things we
say in terms of ontological inventories we hold, our statements are
meaningful. They may not be true, of course, or reasonable, but they are
meaningful. But if we say things that we cannot account for using the
materials in our inventories, we speak "non-sense," in the almost literal
sense I've been referring to.
Here's a frivolous comparison: The person who walks into a Burger King
and asks for a Whopper has said something meaningful; the person who
makes the same request in a Taco Bell has uttered "nonsense," because
Whoppers do not appear on the Taco Bell ontological inventory.
But why would we-and how could we-commit this sort of nonsense?
Unless we are being deliberately fantastic or perverse, wouldn't we
necessarily talk only about things that are real, at least by our own
ontological criteria?
This is where the notion of an ontological gap is helpful. The basic idea is
that the ontological inventories that are presupposed by or embedded in the
things we say and think can sometimes diverge from the ontologies that we
are willing consciously and publicly to affirm. For example, I might scoff at
the suggestion that "ghosts" exist in any substantial sense. But even so, I
might talk and act as if ghosts are real. I'm afraid to go into old, dark
houses, maybe, and if I am induced to enter I scream with fright when the
wind makes a mournful sound in the window. I say, and consciously believe,
that I don't believe in ghosts, but I live as if ghosts are real.
In the book I describe this situation as presenting an "ontological gap" -a
gap between, on the one hand, the presupposed ontological inventories that
inform the ways we talk and live and, on the other, the inventories we are
willing to own up to. Nonsense (meaning non-sense) can occur when we
live and speak in one of these ontological gaps. And we might properly
subject our statements to an "ontological audit" (of which the early Socratic
dialogues are good examples) to see whether or not we can give an account
of them in terms of things we list on our owned ontological inventories: if
we cannot, the suspicion is that we are within such a gap and we are uttering
nonsense. Law's Quandary is an effort to perform that sort of Socratic
ontological audit on contemporary law-talk.
CLASSICAL AND MODERN ACCOUNTS
The investigation begins by noting the large gulf between what we can
call the classical and modern accounts of law. (These are simplifying
composites, of course.) What I call the classical account operated with an
ontological inventory that featured God as a central reality. God, it was
believed, created and governs the world according to a providential plan,
and law is a sort of participation in this plan. Perhaps the most developed
2006]
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version of this view was offered by Thomas Aquinas, but leading thinkers
over the centuries expressed similar views. We can limit ourselves to
Blackstone's statement: "This law of nature," Blackstone explained,
being co-eval with mankind and dictated by God himself, is of
course superior in obligation to any other.... [N]o human laws
are of any validity, if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid
derive all their force, and all their authority, mediately or
immediately, from this original. 9
By contrast, the modern view, working with an ontological inventory
heavily informed by scientific naturalism, finds this account of law
inadmissible, and so tries to develop accounts of law that shun exotic or
what we might call "thick" ontological commitments and that instead
depend entirely on more mundane realities.
Holmes is the prophet of this modern approach. Holmes acknowledges
that much law-talk seems to presuppose that law is "a transcendental body
of law outside of any particular State but obligatory within it." "It is very
hard," he admitted, "to resist the impression that there is one august corpus,
to understand which clearly is the only task of any Court concerned." But
in fact there isn't any such thing, Holmes said, and we know it.10 Law is not
a "brooding omniprescence in the sky."" So he contended in the first
sentence of his famous The Path of the Law essay that "[w]hen we study law
we are not studying a mystery but a well known profession.
1 2
Much of twentieth century legal thought can be understood as a set of
variations on this theme. Thus, legal thinkers have sought to explain away
law's apparent metaphysical commitments by giving an account of law not
as a "mystery" but as a down-to-earth, "well known profession" not
dependent upon any such commitments. Some accounts, like Holmes's
famous prediction theory of law, are behavioral in emphasis: law is the
practice of lawyers making predictions about what judges will do, or
perhaps the practices of legal officials generally. Other accounts are more
discourse-oriented: law is the way lawyers and judges argue and talk.
But Law's Quandary argues, not that these accounts are wrong, exactly-
because they may be accurate as far as they go, and they may provide
valuable insights into the workings of law-but that they are insufficient.
They may tell us true and valuable things about law, but they do not explain
away law's metaphysical commitments: that is because these commitments
pervade and inform the ways that lawyers talk and argue and predict and
9. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *41.
10. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co.,
276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
11. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
12. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457,457 (1897).
[Vol. 55:639
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that judges decide and justify. So modern theories of law are too often like
explanations of a Rembrandt painting that instead of focusing on the artist's
aesthetic vision would substitute detailed physiological accounts of the
muscular movements in the arm and hand that pushed the brush.
This argument occupies several chapters, and I don't think I can try to
present the argument here. (And of course I wouldn't want to take away
anyone's incentive to read the book.) But perhaps I can give one example.
Much legal discourse, especially in "common law" contexts, consists of the
marshaling and analysis of case law in the effort to convince a court that
"the law" requires a particular outcome in a controversy. Non-lawyers
often find this practice curious-"weird or exotic," as Cass Sunstein
acknowledges. 3 In most areas of life, of course, we give some weight to
what happened in the past, for a variety of reasons, but we typically do not
engage in a refined, intricate, even apparently obsessive effort to extract
some "rule of decision" -something that is supposed to be somehow
lurking in past precedents-and then treat that rule as "binding" us in our
present choice. So what is the point or function of this precedent-practice
that is at the heart of law-talk?
In the classical account, it was a commonplace that "the decisions of
courts" are not themselves law, exactly, but rather, as Blackstone explained,
"'the evidence of what is common law."",14 Joseph Story famously wrote for
the Supreme Court in Swift v. Tyson 5 that "it will hardly be contended that
the decisions of Courts constitute laws. They are, at most, only evidence of
what the laws are; and are not of themselves laws." So it seems that the
intricate analysis of precedents was in some sense a way of ascertaining
some "law" that transcended the particular decisions. Quoting Richard
Hooker's statement that law sits "'in the bosom of God, her voice the
harmony of the world,"' Robert Gordon observes that pre-Holmesian
lawyers "had, as they saw it, a direct line to God's mind through their
knowledge of the principles of legal science. ,16
The modern view cannot accept this account, of course-indeed it was
just this view that was the target of Holmes's scornful remark that law is not
a "brooding omnipresence in the sky"-and so it tends to say that the
\
13. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 14 (1996).
14. BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at *71 (emphasis added); see also MAITHEW HALE, THE
HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 45 (Charles M. Gray ed., Univ. of Chi. Press
1971) (1713) (asserting that judicial decisions "are less than a Law, yet they are a greater
Evidence thereof than the Opinion of any private Persons").
15. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 37 (1842) (emphasis added), overruled by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
16. Robert W. Gordon, The Path of the Lawyer, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1013, 1013 (1997)
(quoting Richard Hooker, Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, in 1 WORKS OF RICHARD
HOOKER 197, 285 (John Keble ed., 7th ed. 1888)).
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common law decisions and doctrines are "judge-made law." Common law
judges are not finding or ascertaining law that in some mysterious sense is
already there, but rather are acting as mini-legislators-interstitial
legislators, we may say, to minimize the offense to the notion that law is
supposed to come from elected legislators.
We say this. But if we pause to contemplate more closely how we talk
and behave, it appears that, even today, we treat the precedents more as
"evidence" of law. So we may say that a judicial decision is judge-made
law. But in relying upon the decision, we do not treat everything the judge
said as legally authoritative. Instead we search for "the holding" and
dismiss the rest as "dicta." And that authoritative nugget-the holding-
turns out to be elusive: the efforts of generations of theorists to figure out
the method for extracting it have by now been effectively abandoned. In
fact, the holding may not correspond to anything that was explicitly said in
the decision.
Nor do we treat the individual decision as determinative in its own right.
Instead, using the scores of different techniques that Karl Llewellyn so
painstakingly charted, we try to harmonize it with other decisions to figure
out what "the law" is. If a decision is in a so-called "case of first
impression," or even if it overrules a past precedent, we do not hesitate to
apply it even to conduct that occurred before the decision was rendered: due
process or "ex post facto" type concerns are not violated, we say, because
the decision did not "make law" but merely declared "what the law is" in
some kind of perpetual present tense.
These practices all seem congruent with the classical presupposition that
judicial decisions are not "legislation," or "judge-made law," but rather
evidence of law. As Lon Fuller perceptively explained:
[I]t is not too much to say that the judges are always ready to look
behind the words of a precedent to what the previous court was
trying to say, or to what it would have said if it could have
foreseen the nature of the cases that were later to arise, or if its
perception of the relevant factors in the case had been more acute.
There is, then, a real sense in which the written words of the
reported decisions are merely the gateway to something lying
behind them that may be called, without any excess of poetic
license, "unwritten law."
Judges ... are apt to talk as if they were all working together in
bringing to adequate expression a preexisting thing called "The
Law.", 7
17. LON L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW 92, 98 (1968) (emphasis added). Fuller
noted that this characterization would typically be dismissed today as a "childish fiction," and
[Vol. 55:639
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My example has been taken from common law. Enacted law presents
different questions, which occupy two chapters of the book. I'm not going
to try even to summarize that argument, but will only indicate the
conclusion: I think that much of enacted law can be accounted for without
presupposing anything metaphysically exotic. But in our more ambitious or
pretentious performances-in much constitutional law under the First or
Fourteenth Amendments, for example-much of what we do with enacted
law makes little sense except on the assumption that this law is in some
sense the product of an author who transcends the mundane legislators or
enactors who sit in Congress or the state legislatures. Indeed, Ronald
Dworkin's influential account in effect asserts as much. Thus, Dworkin
argues that judges need to "identify legal rights and duties, so far as
possible, on the assumption that they were all created by a single author...
expressing a coherent conception of justice and fairness"'8 a single author
who would be a fitting conversation partner for his renowned and
superhuman interpreter Hercules.
I think Dworkin is onto something here: law (and the ambitious
pronouncements of courts that Dworkin has spent much of his career
justifying) would indeed be authoritative for us in the way he wants it to be
if law and the decisions it informs were in fact the product of such a
prodigious author. And, conversely, those pronouncements have little or no
claim on our respect if law is not the product of such an author. The
baffling part of Dworkin's account -for me, anyway -is his assumption that
a merely fictional "as if" author can satisfy that need.
In short, both in our common law practices and in our treatment of
enacted law, we continue to do and say a great deal that might make sense
on classical assumptions-I'm noncommital on that-but that is hard to
account for or justify using only the sparser, modern ontological
commitments.
If this assessment of our situation is accurate, then it appears that we are
living-at least when we do and talk law-in an ontological gap. Brian
Simpson, the eminent legal historian, gives a succinct statement of our
situation:
For lawyers, to quote E.P. Thompson, writing in 1975 of what he
calls "the greatest of all legal fictions", "the law itself evolves,
from case to case, by its own impartial logic, true only to its own
integrity.. .. " There is, of course, a sense in which nobody really
believes this any more, but it remains the case that much legal
he accepted the characterization while pointing out that the fiction was often a useful one. Id.
at 98.
18. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 225 (1986) (emphasis added).
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behaviour proceeds on the assumption that the law is like that.
For example, all legal argument in court makes this assumption."
Simpson's observation allows us to restate the perplexity that, I argue,
afflicts contemporary law-talk. Earlier I said that the perplexity lies in the
fact that so much of law-talk seems to be "just words." Now we can say that
the perplexity lies in a disjunction between what our talk and practices seem
to presuppose that law is and what, when directly confronted, we say we
believe law is (and is not).
The puzzle reflects what Duncan Kennedy has described as "[t]he
simultaneously critical and 'believing' character of American legal
consciousness, its paradoxical combination of skepticism and faith. 2 We
scoff at the idea that law could be the sort of metaphysically thick reality
that our ancestors said it was. We chuckle at the idea of law as "a brooding
omnipresence in the sky." And yet.., we continue to act and talk as if law
were something like that.
In a sense there is nothing at all novel in this observation. For
generations now, theorists have noted this discrepancy, and over and over
again, from Holmes on, they have confidently predicted that law-talk will
soon be transformed into something very different-something more
congruent with modern notions of what law is. And yet, also over and over
again, the revolution fails to occur, and lawyers and judges go on talking
more or less as they have for generations, even centuries. Thus, the
historian and law professor Norman Cantor observes that "[a] London
barrister of 1540, quick-frozen and revived in New York today, would only
need a year's brush-up course at NYU School of Law to begin civil practice
as a partner in a midtown or Wall Street corporate-law firm."21 In his less
sanguine moments, even Judge Posner admits as much. He laments that
"[t]his traditional conception of law.., is as orthodox today ... as it was a
century ago.,
22
This is law's quandary. So, what should we make of this peculiar
situation?
WHERE (AND How) ARE WE?
The final chapter of Law's Quandary discusses four possible accounts of
our situation: for now I'm going to briefly describe three of these (leaving
19. A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, LEADING CASES IN THE COMMON LAW 10 (1995) (emphasis
added) (footnote omitted) (quoting E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF
THE BLACK ACT 250 (1975)).
20. DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION [FIN DE SILCLE) 79 (1997).
21. NORMAN F. CANTOR, IMAGINING THE LAW 192 (1997).




out the account that asserts that we are what I call "ad hoc Platonists").
Each of these accounts may contain some measure of truth, but each also
provokes doubts or objections.
One possibility is that law-talk today is basically a sort of holdover, or
survival, from an older, more classical world. Law-talk once made sense,
maybe, based on the classical ontological assumptions that prevailed, and
though those assumptions have long since been abandoned, we continue to
talk in much the same way, maybe from tradition or habit. So lawyers are
like erstwhile religionists who, though they have lost the faith, still
instinctively cross themselves, or utter traditional prayers, or engage in
other forms of religion that made sense under beliefs they formerly held.
Just as these neophyte nonbelievers persist in certain religious practices out
of habit, conventional law-talk continues on the strength of tradition.
The "survival" account is a familiar one: Holmes and his descendants
have often viewed the persistence of conventional legal discourse in this
way. But as time passes, the account begins to lose some of its credibility;
that is because the evident tenacity of legal discourse seems hard to explain
as a mere lifeless holdover. For example, in the 1930s Felix Cohen
described the "Restatement" project as "the last long-drawn-out gasp of a
dying tradition."3 Maybe... but seventy years later the tradition seems to
be taking an awfully long time to die: on the contrary, it continues gasping
away cheerfully and vigorously, and it shows no signs of stopping any time
soon.
So are there any other possibilities?
A second account can be described as the "bad faith" or "idolatry"
interpretation. In this view, law has come to serve as a resource for
satisfying our personal and collective needs for transcendent meaning.
Holmes wrote that "[t]here is in all men a demand for the superlative," and
that demand is so inexorable that "the poor devil who has no other way of
reaching it attains it by getting drunk., 24 But there are better satisfactions
than getting drunk. The "demand for the superlative" points many of us to
religion, but if "religion" is rejected, the need nonetheless persists, and it
will strive to find satisfaction elsewhere. "'Man cannot exist without bowing
before something,"' Dostoevsky said. "'Let him reject God, and he will
bow before an idol.'
25
The role of idol can be filled by various objects of devotion. Among the
more eligible objects of veneration, however, law surely ranks near the top.
23. Cohen, supra note 7, at 823, 833 (arguing that "olur legal system is filled with
supernatural concepts").
24. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40, 40 (1918).
25. FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, THE NOTEBOOKS FOR A RAW YOUTH 178-79 (Edward
Wasiolek ed., Victor Terras trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 1969).
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Its power, its majesty, its imperial scope, its deep roots in tradition, and its
well-honed ceremonialism all fit it for the role.
Law's function as a religion-substitute becomes apparent when it is
considered in its social and political context. Morton Horwitz observes that
[i]f you look at the relationship between law and religion in
American society, you will see the tremendous connection
between the two and the ways in which law came in the late
nineteenth century to replace religion as one of the dominant
forms of certainty and legitimacy in social life.26
Numerous constitutional scholars have noticed the ways in which law-
especially constitutional law-has operated in a way analogous to religion,
or has performed the functions elsewhere served by religion.27
If law is conscripted to perform the functions of religion, however, we
should hardly be surprised if law comes to be endowed with some of the
attributes of religion -including some of religion's references to more
transcendent realities or sources of meaning. Scholars like Robert Bellah
have studied how law makes up part of a "civil religion" in American
society." And in a more jurisprudential vein, Pierre Schlag describes
modern legal thought as "the Continuation of God by Other Means."'2 9
Schlag explores parallels between the classic philosophical arguments for
the existence of God and the defenses of the enterprise of law made by
modern thinkers ranging from formalists such as Joseph Beale to
contemporary mainstream, pragmatist, and postmodern scholars like Owen
Fiss, Margaret Jane Radin, Frank Michelman, and Jack Balkin.3" These
legal thinkers do not explicitly or consciously embrace the theological
framework that they inadvertently imitate. Even so, Schlag argues that
their ways of thinking and arguing show that they are engaged in a
"residually theological discourse."31
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Of course, any endowment of law with transcendent qualities will clash
with prevailing modern assumptions. Law is not really a proper object of
worship, we think. Law is made by and for human beings: it is not a
superhuman source of wisdom. From a religious perspective, therefore,
treating law as if it had such qualities is a form of idolatry.32 From a more
secular perspective, a similar judgment might be expressed in terms of "bad
faith." Thus, Schlag suggests that the modern practice of law is pervasively
in "bad faith." In a similar spirit, Roberto Unger famously described the
legal professoriate as "a priesthood that had lost their faith and kept their
jobs.
33
More recently, Duncan Kennedy has offered an extensive and nuanced
diagnosis of modern legal culture that pervasively depends on ascriptions of
bad faith.34 And Kennedy may have a surprising ally.., in Justice Scalia.
Dan Farber and Suzanna Sherry quote a provocative statement in which
Scalia observes: "'That is why, by the way, I never thought Oliver Wendell
Holmes and the legal realists did us a favor by pointing out that all these
legal fictions were fictions: Those judges wise enough to be trusted with the
secret already knew it."' 35 Farber and Sherry suggest that although Scalia
advocates a rigorously formalist view of law, "there is some evidence that
he views [this account of law] as a sort of noble myth to which judges ought
to give their allegiance even if it is not wholly true."
36
Although in some respects this seems a plausible interpretation of our
situation, I think the "bad faith" or "noble myth" account fails to register
the full complexities of the internal dissonance in contemporary legal
culture. In ordinary bad faith, a person professes (to others, and perhaps to
himself as well) to believe in something that at some deeper level he does
not really believe. His hypocrisy or self-deception serves his interests,
because without an inauthentic profession of belief he would have to
relinquish something he values. In contemporary legal culture, on the
contrary, practitioners profess not to believe in something-the
metaphysical law-that their talk and practice would suggest they do, at
some level, believe in. And since their practice-or, more generally, the
"rule of law" itself-is something that they evidently value, their dissonant
professions of unbelief in the presuppositions of law are not self-serving in
any straightforward sense.
32. See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, Idolatry in Constitutional Interpretation, in AGAINST THE
LAW 157, 159 (Paul F. Campos et a). eds., 1996)
33. Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV.
561, 674-75 (1983).
34. KENNEDY, supra note 20, at 339-40.
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To put the point differently, if lawyers were practicing bad faith in the
typical sense, then we might expect them to protect their practice by
avowing the assumptions presupposed in the practice, not by disavowing
those assumptions. Disillusioned ministers or pastors are said to do this;
they pretend to believe in God or the soul or the resurrection even though
in fact they regard these doctrines as useful myths. Unger's comparison of
law professors to a "priesthood that had lost their faith but kept theirjobs"
draws on this sort of comparison. But on closer examination, it seems that
lawyers and law professors do just the opposite of the bad faith pastor: they
persist in the practice while denying its ontological presuppositions. They
avow belief in the practice, but not in the metaphysical premises that seem
necessary to support the practice.
Or, to shift to the religious vocabulary, if contemporary law is a species of
idolatry, it is a peculiar and confusing sort of idolatry in which the devotees
regularly deny that the idol has the transcendent qualities it would need to
have to justify the uses they make of it.
This perplexing condition invites us to consider a different and almost
opposite possibility: Could it be that at some level legal practitioners do
sincerely believe in the metaphysical law, and that if they are guilty of "bad
faith," their misrepresentation or self-deception occurs not when they
engage in the practice and discourse of law, but rather when they disavow
its metaphysical commitments? In short, the behavior of lawyers and judges
suggests that if they are guilty of "bad faith," the self-deception occurs not
when they practice law but when they theorize about it- and when in the
course of such theorizing they deny the metaphysical commitments that at
some level they actually hold.37
This observation leads to a third possible interpretation of our situation,
which I call the neo-classical position. This is a position that in some
respects is reflected in certain natural law theorists-though not so much, it
seems to me, in what is sometimes called the "new natural law" advocated
by people like John Finnis. But perhaps the most provocative proponent is
Joseph Vining. Law's Quandary devotes several pages to an attempt to
present Vining's views, but since it is not an easy task to summarize those
views, and since we have the good fortune of having Vining here with us,
I'm not going to try to do it here.
I'll say just this much: Vining challenges the assumption that most of us
hold, probably quite unreflectively, that we have privileged and
unproblematic access to our own beliefs. We discover what we genuinely
37. There is still another possibility: Lawyers might be in bad faith both in their practice
and in their theorizing. They might in fact adhere to a kind of faith that they hide or disavow
in their explicit theorizing; but that faith might not be one that would support the current
operations of legal practice.
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believe, he suggests, not through a quick inward glance at our mental
landscape, but rather only by careful reflection on what we think we believe
as well as the ways we speak and the ways we act. Our deepest beliefs are
not immediately and reliably observable (even to ourselves), but rather are
what animate and are presupposed by our ways of talking and living. And
the ways we talk and live in the law provide valuable material for this
reflective inquiry into what we genuinely believe.
Conducting that inquiry, Vining argues that we discover in our practice of
law a commitment to authority, and not just to the authoritarian. We
discover a commitment, in other words, to something that has a legitimate
call on our attention and respect. But the authority possessing those
features could not be an inanimate rule, or a faceless bureaucrat, or even a
wise but long-dead "framer." It would need to be something personal in
nature, and something that cares about us and speaks to us, now. In short,
something (or rather someone) transcendent.
Vining concedes that if it is approached in this way, law becomes "an
object of amazement to the modern and postmodern mentality." '38 And he
points out that, reflectively studied, law and its presuppositions will be
"subversive" of twentieth century thought-of the materialism evident in so
much work in the sciences and social sciences, but also of "what goes by the
name postmodernism in literary and philosophic studies."39 Here is what he
says:
But if, the way we and the world and the universe are, we cannot
do without authority, without saying you ought, you must, we will
produce suffering and take responsibility for it, I ought, I must, I
must suffer if I do not-and if authority is impossible should this
something more not exist-then we have some evidence that what
we must believe, is. What we must believe, must be, not because it
exists if we believe it exists, but because we exist and have been
given the means, by our work, to continue existing. 4
CONCLUSION
I find Vining's reflections intriguing, even inspiring, but I am not sure
whether I think they are wholly persuasive. So I have doubts about his
account, as I have doubts about the "survival" and "bad faith" accounts. So
if I can use Vining's terms, I would say that my own reflective inquiry into
what I genuinely believe doesn't seem to have reached a comfortable
resting point. Much less can I tell readers where their own inquiries should
settle.
38. JOSEPH VINING, FROM NEWTON'S SLEEP 110 (1995).
39. Id. at 208.
40. Id. at 264-65.
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I know that some readers find this ending disappointing. A really good
book would offer a prescription for a cure, or a remedy for our quandary.
At the very least it would give a more definitive diagnosis of our situation. I
apologize for these deficiencies, but I try to make the best of a bad situation
by ending the book on the same Socratic theme with which it began. Many
of the Socratic dialogues end in perplexity, after all, and Socrates seemed to
think that attaining perplexity was a sort of achievement (though probably
not the highest achievement). In part that was because, as he put it, "it is
the most blameworthy ignorance to believe that one knows what one does
not know."4' And in part it was because an admission of perplexity might
make us open, as Socrates said was true in his own case, to a "wisdom more
than human," or to the kind of inner "voice" that he himself heard and took
to be a "divine or spiritual sign. 42 If Socrates was right in this, then it might
be that, unlikely as it may seem, reflecting on jurisprudence might do after
all what Holmes said it should do: it might allow us to "connect [the] subject
with the universe and catch an echo of the infinite.,
43
41. PLATO, Apology 29b, in PLATO: COMPLETE WORKS 27 (John M. Cooper ed., 1997).
42. Id. 20e, at 21, 22c, at 22, 31d, at 29.
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